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The lone West Virginia case dealing with the underground storage of fugacious minerals is Tate v. United Fuel Gas Co., 137 W.Va.
272, 71 S.E.2d 65 (1952). In that case 0, the owner of a tract of
land in fee, conveyed it to P, excepting and reserving the oil and gas.
Thereafter, 0 conveyed an undivided interest in the oil and gas to
Z. 0 and Z leased the oil and gas to D. 0 and Z then entered into
an agreement with D granting to the latter the exclusive right to use
the Big Lime stratum for storage of gas. P, alleging that there is no
recoverable gas and oil in the Big Lime stratum, sought an injunction to restrain D's use thereof for such purposes, cancellation of
the gas storage agreement as a cloud on his title, and a decree for
the value of the use of the premises. The court held that P was
vested with title to the Big Lime stratum (since O's deed excepted
and reserved the oil and gas and not the limestone) and that a
court of equity had jurisdiction to remove cloud on title and to
enjoin a continuing trespass.
Since in the Tate case, P, the owner of the Big Lime stratum,
was able to maintain a suit against the injector of the gas for trespass, it appears that the West Virginia court is in line with the view
expressed in the principal case. Thus, title to natural gas is not lost
by its injection into underground storage reservoirs. If title to the
gas were lost upon its injection into the ground, there could not have
been liability for trespass in the Tate case.
Nick George Zegrea

Municipal Corporations-Violation of Municipal OrdinanceLiability of Abutting Owners and Occupants of Streets
and Sidewalks
Action by a pedestrian against a municipality, an owner of a
building, and an occupant of the building for injuries sustained
when she fell on a sidewalk in front of a store which was owned by
the occupant of the building. The sidewalk was paved by the occupants with terrazzo in a manner which constituted a violation of
a city ordinance. The lower court directed a verdict for all three
defendants. Held, the lower court's decision, in relation to the city
and the owner of the building, in finding as a matter of law that the
sidewalk was maintained in a "reasonably safe condition for travel
in the ordinary modes with ordinary care by day or night", is affirmed. The court reversed and remanded as to the occupant of the
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building, holding that since the
of a municipal ordinance, such
the occupant if it be found by
proximate cause of the injury.
S.E.2d 513 (W. Va. 1960).
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occupant's conduct was in violation
violation may impose liability upon
the jury that such conduct was the
Costello v. City of Wheeling, 117

Under common law no duty was imposed upon the owner or
occupant to maintain the street or sidewalk abutting his premises
in a safe condition. Rich v. Rosenshine, 131 W. Va. 30, 45 S.E.2d
449 (1947). As a corollary to this rule, no liability attached to the
occupant for injuries which were sustained as a result of the streets
and sidewalks being out of repair. Annot., 41 A.L.R. 212 (1926);
6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORP. § 22.12 (3d ed. 1949). The duty
to maintain streets and sidewalks in a safe condition devolved upon
municipalities when by their own charters they were required to keep
streets and sidewalks in repair. W. VA. CODE ch. 17, art. 10 § 17
(Michie 1955). In order to obtain more efficient municipal organization the cities have enacted ordinances which delegate this responsibiltiy to the owners and occupants of premises which abut the
city's streets and sidewalks. To what extent do violations of such
ordinances place civil liability upon the owners and occupants of
of such premises?
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has on two recent occasions been concerned with violations of similar ordinances.
Barniak v. Grossman Jewelry Co., 141 W. Va. 760, 93 S.E.2d
49 (1956); Rich v. Rosenshine, supra. The Barniak case has been the
subject of recent law review comment. Comment, 59 W. VA. L. REv.
90 (1956). The Rich and Barniak cases dealt with the violation of
snow and ice ordinances which may be equated with the type of
ordinance involved in the principal case. In both cases the occupant
of the abutting premises was held liable, which holdings manifested
a complete divergence from the common law concept. The interesting point is that in the Rich and Barniak cases and now in the principal case the West Virginia court has held the owner or occupant
liable for violation of a municipal ordinance when their conduct is
the proximate cause of the injury, but the court omits any discussion in relation to whether this type of ordinance was enacted for
the benefit of the traveling public. It is a fundamental principle
that in order for violation of an ordinance to constitute actionable
negligence, the ordinance must be designed to protect that class
of which the injured person is a member. Cooper v. Agee, 222
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Ala. 334, 132 So. 173 (1930); 6
§ 22.05 (3d ed. 1949).

MCQUILLIN,

MUNICIPAL CORP.

This precise question was considered in Johnson v. Bell, 117
S.E.2d 85 (Va. 1960). The court held that an ordinance, which
places the responsibility on abutting owners and occupants to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk, is not for the benefit of
the traveling public, but was enacted merely for the benefit of
the municipality as an organized government. This represents the
prevailing view throughout the country. For a collection of cases
see Annot., 24 A.L.R. 387 (1923). The plaintiff in the Johnson
case, supra, attempted to base his recovery upon Rich v. Rosenshine, supra, and Barniak v. Grossman Jewelry Co., supra. The
court recognized that both cases are contra to the weight of authority. The West Virginia court has thus placed upon the owners
and occupants of premises which abut streets and sidewalks the
onerous task of bearing civil liability for not maintaining the streets
and sidewalks in accordance with the municipal ordinance. It would
appear in view of this abandonment of established concepts that
a discussion as to whom such ordinances were designed to benefit
would be germane.
Under the common law view and in the majority of jurisdictions it is incumbent upon a municipality to maintain its streets
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel, and this
duty cannot be avoided, suspended, delegated or passed on to others
by any act of the municipality. W. T. Grant Co. v. Casody, 117 Colo.
405, 188 P.2d 881 (1948). A corollary to this rule is found in
the almost universal concept that a primary obligation is imposed
upon the municipality, and when such responsibility is delegated
to an owner or occupant of abutting premises this places upon
them only a secondary duty. W. T. Grant Co. v. Casody, supra.
Some authority to the contrary can be found where the owner or
occupant has a primary obligation and a secondary duty is imposed
upon the city. Brody v. City of Philadelphia, 156 Pa. Super. 607,
41 A.2d 355 (1945). In many jurisdictions if the municipality is
not liable then the occupant cannot be held liable as he occupies
a position of secondary obligation. W. T. Grant Co. v. Casody, supra.
In the principal case the majority opinion determined that the
municipality was not liable as a matter of law, but recognized
that this did not exonerate the occupant from liability. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is now taking the occupant
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out of the rank of secondary obligation and placing upon him the
primary duty of maintaining the abutting streets and sidewalks in
a reasonably safe condition. Thus the principal case manifests
another extension of the occupant's liability.
Upon first glance it would appear that West Virginia is now
in accord with the view as expressed in the Brody case, supra.
However, in Pennsylvania the ultimate burden of recovery rests
upon the owner or occupant of premises which abut the city's streets
and sidewalks. By this view, a recovery is permitted against the
city only by virtue of the fact that the city has failed to discharge
its duty to require the owner or occupant of abutting property to
maintain the streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. Brody v. City of Philadelphia, supra. It is still recognized
in West Virginia, however, that the city is absolutely liable for
injuries resulting from its streets and sidewalks being out of repair.
Costello v. City of Wheeling, supra. Is the court in the Costello
case contending that the municipality is absolutely liable for injuries
resulting from its streets and sidewalks being out of repair, yet
occupying a position of secondary obligation? If an injured party
recovers against the city does the city then have a right of indemnity
from the owner or occupant?
In the Rich, Barniak and now Costello cases, the owner and
occupant of premises which abut city streets and sidewalks no
longer find themselves protected under the cloak of the common
law and majority rule which relieves them from any civil liability
for injuries resulting from a violation of municipal ordinances in
relation to the maintenance of city streets and sidewalks. In the
future when the occasion arises it would appear incumbent upon
the West Virginia court to state explicitly that such ordinances do
inure to the benefit of the traveling public, and also to resolve
the question in relation to primary and secondary liability which
is inherent in this problem. When such a pronouncement is made,
the court will have totally defined its position in a clear and concise
fashion.
Arthur Mark Recht
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